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competence and integrity in the student, and obligations to the patient. Pelle-
grino's suggestions are not without their limitations, but he succeeds in identifying 
several problems, stating the issues within each problem, and making reasonable 
suggestions to resolve them . He also succeeds in putting his finger on many of the 
problems that need serious debate within medical schools. 
These essays are not to be read quickly. Each has something to say, and it is 
worth considering. The book deserves a wide reading among physicians in private 
practice and especially by those physicians and other individuals who are involved 
in medical education. 
- Thomas A. Shannon 
Associate Professor of Medical Ethics, Department of Psychiatry 
University of Massachusetts Medical Cente"r 
The Ethics 0/ Homicide 
Philip K Devine 
Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts PI., Ithaca, N.Y. 14850. 1978, 247 pp., 
$12.95. 
Among other things, this book gives a survey of recent views in secular phil-
osophy on abortion, euthanasia, rights of animals (and plants), and rights of 
persons. After reading this survey, a Catholic with a decent upbringing can only 
come away with the overwhelming impression that the chief characteristic of 
modern secular ethics is its utter moral bankruptcy. (This judgment does not 
apply to Devine himself who tries to stand apart from the general trend.) 
What else can we conclude when a philosopher of obvious good-will must twist 
and turn through several pages (46-106) to prove that a human person deserves 
more respect than a cabbage? (Devine reports, and tries to refute, the arguments 
of philosophers who hold that rights are based on "interests" and since plants as 
well as humans have "interests," then the statuses of plants and humans are 
basically the same [pp. 48-49].) What else can we conclude when a philosopher of 
good-will feels required to treat with respect (although disagreement) the ethical 
condoning of infanticide (pp. 64-69)? And what finally can we conclude, except that 
modern secular ethics is corrupt, when a large number of philosophers will con-
done any act, from judicial murder to geronticide and genocide, if it appears that 
it will produce the best results in the long run? 
A case in point of the gymnastics some philosophers will perform to keep their 
desired conclusions is Michael Tooley. Philosophers had shown that if you deny 
fetuses (unborn babies) the right to life, then, logically, you must also deny 
infants the right to life. Whereupon, Tooley concluded that infanticide must be 
permissible, arguing that a being has rights only if it is self-conscious and has 
desires that can be frustrated. It was then pointed out that both common sense 
and the law attribute rights to infants, such as not to be mutilated, or not to be 
robbed of an inheritance. Tooley replied that such rights are based on the fact 
that the infant will, in the future, come to desire that the violation (e.g., mutila-
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tion) had not occurred, but this did not mean that infants have a right to life , 
since if the infant is killed no future desire would be frustrated, the future desires 
being killed along with the infant. I call these gymnastics. Devine points out that 
according to Tooley 's argument, if you injure an infant you had better finish the 
job and kill him. It seems that Tooley will accept any conclusion, however absurd, 
as long as abortion remains permitted. 
In chapter 1 Devine argues that homicide is prima facie wrong, not because of 
its overall consequences (against "pure" consequentialists) but because of the 
harm done to the person kill ed . Personal human life is valuable in itself and must 
not be destroyed unless there are stringent justifications. Further, what is valuable 
is personal human life itself, and not simply a certain "quality " of life . 
In two important chapters (2 and 3), Devine considers the question: What is 
the dividing line betwen two persons with a right to life, and nonpersons? He 
rejects what he calls the "present enjoyment principle," which says that only 
those who are in "prese nt possession of distinctively human traits" are persons. 
This is the principle abortionists invoke, arguing that fetuses or embryos are not 
persons since they do not "socialize," reason, etc. Devine points out that on this 
principle not only fetuses but also infants and the reversibly comatose (indeed, all 
of us. during a good' night's sleep) would not be persen& Thus- abortion , infanti-
cide, and killing the reversibly comatose are logically in the same boat. Devine 
does not prove that all of these acts are wrong. Rather, he relies on our intuitions 
to know that infanticide is wrong and infers from that to the defectiveness of the 
"present enjoyment principle." 
Devine takes the position that a person is a being who has a capacity for 
consciousness, meaningful communication, etc. Since both fetuses and infants will 
develop , if nothing goes wrong, into conscious and speaking human beings, it 
follows that they, like unconscious adults, are human persons. 
However, he denies that the irreversibly comatose, or the severely mentally 
retarded who never develop speech, have a capacity for specifically human acts. 
These creatures he calls humans, but not persons. He thus condones abortion for 
certain "fetal indications" (e.g., Tay-Sachs disease but not mongolism) and the 
killing of the irreversibly comatose. 
Likewise, he holds that the embryo is not a person at least until after twinning 
becomes impossible, since individuation is an essential component of p ersonhood. 
Thus he seems also to condone early abortions. (In brief criticism of Devine at this 
point: the possibility of twinning does not show lack of individuation in the 
embryo, since twinning could be a process like parthenogenesis; that is, twinning 
might simply be the production of a new individual from a cell of the first, and 
continually ex isting, individual. Hence we have no warrant not to treat the 
embryo from fertilization onward as a human person.) 
Devine argues for a 'k ind of "mixed" consequential ism. That is , he rejects the 
justification of killing simply on the grounds that "it offers the best results on the 
whole" (p. 138). He argues that "there seems no stable way of walling off this 
kind of justification and blocking its extension to cases where it is clearly 
unacceptable" (p. 150). Hence he restricts justifications of homicide to two 
forms: 1) cases of "extreme necessity," and 2) defense of oneself or others against 
an "aggressor." 
By the principl e of "extreme necessity" he understands that "if the decedent 
(i.e., victim) loses nothing by being killed (being certainly doomed to die very 
shortly in any case) and others who would die otherwise will be saved by his being 
killed, then killing is justified" (p. 145). On this principle Devine justifies abortion 
in the (rare)cases where otherwise both mother and baby would die , as well as 
many other types 'df dire'ct killing. 
In the principle of defense of self and others, he understands "aggressor" in a 
causal sense rather than a moral or juridical one. Thus Devine considers an 
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"aggressor" an unborn baby whose li fe threa tens its mother's life, and so on this 
principle he justifies abortion to save the life of the mother , even if otherwise the 
baby would live. He considers war direct killing, bu t justifies it by this principle 
also. 
"Extreme necessi ty " and defense against "aggressors" are the only justifica' 
tions Devine allows. Hence "mercy killing," whether voluntary or invo luntary, is 
rejected. Whether suicide is morall y permiss ible he leaves undecided in this book 
but he insists that suicides must not be assisted . ' 
Thus Devine's conclusions might be called "moderate" in relation to secular 
ethics in general: he rejects abortion o n demand, euthanasia , killing simply for 
utilitarian reasons; but he condo nes som e early abort ions, abortions to save the 
mother's life, abortions for certain "fetal indica tions," killing the irreversibly 
comatose, and direct killing in a host of other cases describable as defe nse o f self 
or others. 
I select two areas for basic criticism : his criterion of personhood, and his 
"mixed" consequential ism : 
a) Devine rightly explains that moral rights - the right of a person to be treated 
as an end in himself and not a mere m eans, among others - are based on a 
capacity to reason, choose, etc. But h e fa ils to explain why this is so . Rights are 
based on the capacity to reason and choose, not simply because such beings are 
capable of "a specially rich kind of life" (p. 95). Simply, "a richer kind of life" 
denotes a di fference in degree not in kind , and what is needed to justify the qual· 
itatively differen t kind o f respect we pay to human persons, as opposed, say, to 
cabbages or cats, is a quali tative difference in their beings. Briefly, the capacity to 
reason and choose is such a qualitative diffe re nce, because that capacity m eans 
that such a be ing determines himself rather than being a mere passive subject to 
outside forces. A being endowed with the capacity to reason and choose is a 
center of activity, an original source of value, whereas plants and brute animals are 
not unique, being distinctive or individual o nl y through external influences. (This 
does not m ean that plants and brute an imals should always be regarded as m ere 
tools for m an 's use; they a lso deserve respect, not as ends in themselves, which 
they are not, bu t as creatures manifesting the glory of God.) 
Devine condones the killing of the severely retarded (those unable ever to 
speak) and the killing of the irreversibly comatose, because he holds that they lack 
the capacity to speak , reason, etc., and are therefore nonpersons althou gh human. 
But t he capacity to reason and choose be longs to man's nature, so that every 
human be ing has that capac ity. The fact that som e humans will never, in this life, 
actualize that capacity does not evidence a lack of it; it sho ws only that an 
impedim ent - insufficient brain development, for example - prevents the ac tuali· 
zation of that capacity, just as a man sti ll has the in trinsic capacity to m ove his 
arms even if, tied to a tree, he is prevented from actual izing his capac ity. Hence 
every human being is a person and every innocent human being has a right to life. 
b) The central part of Devine's book is his explanat ion of why homicide is 
prima facie wrong (only prima facie since he a llows justifications). It is wrong, he 
says, not merely because of consequences in the long run , but, centrally, because 
of the harm done to the one killed (p. 18). At first sight t his sounds like common 
sense. But note that in this claim Devine m akes the primary source of moral evil 
wholly extrinsic to the will or the will's in trinsic direction. From this premise, the 
conclusions in the rest of the book fo llow: 1) if the victim would die shortly 
anyway, we may kill him, since our act would not increase the amou nt of 
(external) harm that will at any rate occur; 2) the admitted harm to the victim can 
be offset by (seemingly) greater harm that could happen to others if we did not 
kill him. That is, if the original harm effected in homicide is external to the will , 
then other external harms will not be qualitatively"distinct fro m the original harm , 
and thus could quantitatively outweigh it. 
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According to the Catholic tradition, on the contrary, the source of moral evil is 
precisely the intrinsic direction of the will. A Christian knows that adultery is 
committed in the heart even if nothing external has a hair 's chance of occurring, 
and that blasphemy is wrong even though there is, and can be, no direct external 
effect. That is to say, moral evil consists primarily in the will 's repudiation of a 
basic good or value. Thus in the (rare) abortion case , for example, where the 
choice is between directly killing one or letting both die, we are obliged not to 
kill, because the external results are of a different order from that of the interior 
act of will directed against an innocent human life. The interior act of will consti-
tutes a person's deciding for or against the objective order of goodness or value 
established by God Himself. Direct killing can be justified only as defense of self 
or others against unjust aggressors . Only purposeful aggression makes a person not 
innocent and thus deprived of the right not to be killed directly. If someone's life 
endangers the safety of others, through no purposeful act of his own, e.g., because 
he is diseased or because a foreign country threatens to kill hostages if he is not 
killed, such a person still cannot be justly killed . Innocent human life (innocent in 
the sense just explained, and not in a mere causal sense) is inviolable. 
- Patrick Lee, Ph.D. 
St. Francis de Sales ColIege 
Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology 
Charles E. Curran 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind. , 1979. $11.95 (hard cover), 
$4. 95 (soft cover). 
People may disagree with Father Charles Curran's approach to Catholic moral 
theology. They may even argue, as he admits, that he has incorporated so much 
transition into his moral thinking that he has abandoned the Catholic tradition. 
But everyone knows where he stands. His new volume, Transition and Tradition in 
Moral Theology, once more records his opinions clearly, forthrightly, and 
persuasively , for whatever they may be worth. 
In this volume he has skillfully joined nine separate essays prepared for various 
occasions into one volume, with admirable continuity and consistency. The nine 
essays fall neatly into three parts with three chapters each. 
Part one considers general moral theology with an overview chapter and 
separate chapters on contraception and homosexuality . He maintains an even and 
calm style broken by occasional sweeping statements. 
As examples of the latter, consider these three bold and au thoritative 
statements: 
"There can be no doubt in the light of the histor ical circumstanc es that the 
official imposition of Thomism was an attempt to prevent any dialogue with the 
contemporary world and its thought patterns" (p. 12). 
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